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Early June 1950, Major Bill Tilman entered the remote 
Himalayan valley of Nyishang in North Central Nepal. As 
a member of a British reconnaissance party beyond the 
Annapurna massif, he was one of the first Europeans to 
meet the Nyishangba of Manang in their home villages. 
Expecting an unspoilt world to unfold before his eyes, he 
found instead a near-cosmopolitan population, well versed 
in the intricacies of modern trade and travel. Attempting 
to photograph one of the local inhabitants, a villager 
retorted by whipping out a camera himself.
Taking the Nyishangba of Manang as an example, this 
essay seeks to answer the question as to why a high-
mountain population group living in a remote Himalayan 
valley has succeeded so well in establishing a trade 
network covering large parts of South and Southeast Asia, 
and for over a century. 
What then is the story of the Nyishangba? Broadly 
speaking it has been the struggle for survival by an 
ethnic group covering some 6000 souls in a high-altitude 
environment that does not allow for a year-round 
agricultural subsistence. It seems likely that from the 
beginning of settlement in Nyishang, there evolved an 
extra-territorial component in the livelihood strategies of 
its inhabitants. The practice of travelling southwards to 
the middle hills of Nepal during wintertime to trade local 
products like medicinal herbs, skins and musk against 
rice and barley, did allow the Nyishangba to make ends 
meet. Their home valley is still characterized by a mixed 
agricultural economy based on the growing of buckwheat 
and barley under irrigation and the rearing of yak in their 
high mountain pastures, nowadays supplemented with 
income from tourism. The middle hill orientation of their 
traditional trade ventures, stems partly from the isolating 
effect of major mountain ranges to the north, but more so 
from the lack of demand for trade products hailing from 
a similar high-altitude ecological environment. Trans-
Himalayan trade with Tibet has therefore hardly played 
a role in the Nyishangba economy. As time passed by, the 
southward-bound direction of their traditional ventures 
found a follow-up in their later trade expeditions across 
Nepal’s southern border into India, Burma, Thailand, and 
beyond.
Trade, as it developed over the years, brought increased 
mobility for a majority of the Nyishangba. Nowadays, 
one hardly finds a grown-up member of their community 
that has not been outside Nepal and many of them are 
acquainted with Singapore, Bangkok and Hong Kong, 
not to speak of Seoul or Tokyo. Of course, the rise of the 
Nyishangba as long-distance traders did not take place 
overnight. In effect, it took several decades to translate 
their initial gains into the relative – and for some of 
them – absolute wealth that is so characteristic of their 
Kathmandu-based community today. Nevertheless, 
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economic setbacks in the 1980s made part of the traders 
go back to their home district trying to recover some of 
their losses through participation in a nascent tourist 
industry. It is not the place here to extensively review the 
geographical history of their trade ventures, which was, 
briefly said, varied, multi-focused and sometimes illicit. 
The whole process boils down to a progressive integration 
into the wider Southeast Asian economy, in particular 
with regard to its urban-industrial centers of capitalist 
advancement during the second half of the twentieth 
century.
Nyishangba ventures, from the late eighteenth century 
onwards, were facilitated through the granting of trade 
privileges and tax exemptions by a rising Nepalese state. 
In 1966, Nyishangba rights were extended ‘indefinitely’. 
The latter decision had far-reaching effects, not so much 
because of the privileges involved per se – for that would 
have meant a mere continuation of the existing situation 
– but because they coincided with further facilities such 
as the liberal granting of passports to the Nyishangba, 
and the introduction of several other trade facilitating 
schemes and regulations. The precise articulation between 
the Nepalese government and the Nyishangba as a group 
have largely escaped scrutiny so far, but it is an established 
fact that the first Nepali passports were issued to leading 
Nyishangba already in 1962. This policy of liberally 
granting passports was continued in the following years, 
and formed a welcome addition to the Indian passports 
and Burmese identity cards that some traders had 
managed to procure. Indeed it opened the way for younger 
traders to undertake long-distance ventures into Southeast 
Asian countries on a par with an older generation that had 
more or less managed to monopolize international trade 
ventures beyond India up till then. 
In addition, liberal import policies greatly facilitated 
the rise of Kathmandu as an import and transit market, 
at a time when India still followed a protectionist and 
restrictive economic foreign policy. This trading paradise 
however would not last. By 1976, the free import and 
transit smuggling of ready-made garments and all kinds 
of fancy goods, especially into India, had aroused so much 
national and international criticism that Nyishangba 
privileges were curtailed.
Despite the curtailment of exclusive Nyishangba rights 
by the Nepalese government in 1976 and the economic 
depression of the 1980s, the bigger trading families for 
a time were able to continue their somewhat unique 
position in the economic landscape of Nepal. As they held 
a tremendous advantage through their superior capital 
position and their knowledge of Southeast Asian markets, 
trusted middlemen, and last but not least their customs 
acquaintances at airports and border posts, they were 
able for a time to outplay new competitors. However, with 
the growing liberalisation of markets and the erosion 
of their traditional trading rights, the Nyishangba have 
become only one set of players in a much wider field of 
competitors than before. 
At this point, we must go back to the main question of 
this essay: why have the Nyishangba succeeded so well 
in trade? Let us try to relate the question to the main 
theme of our conference, that of people and geopolitics 
in Trans-Himalayan trade. For a start, let me try to make 
clear that the phrase ‘Trans-Himalayan trade’ carries 
with it the danger of not granting the Himalayan region 
sufficient right of existence in terms of territorial identity. 
Fortunately, the addition of the term ‘people’ in the 
conference flyer makes us realize that the Himalayan 
region is a legitimate indigenous habitat and not simply 
a borderline drawn on a map, to be crossed only in order 
to be able to speak of Trans-Himalayan trade. Thereto 
comes the term ‘geopolitics’ to remind us that Himalayan 
village communities too are structured by power relations 
that run beyond their immediate surroundings, from the 
national state to the international arena, and that so for 
a long time already. Here we see social groups in their 
geographical and historical cohesiveness in interaction 
with wider settings of economics and geopolitics.
For at least fifty years, anthropologists have increasingly 
extended the study of social relations beyond kinship 
groups. They discovered that social boundaries tend 
to become both more explicit and fluid when external 
contacts intensify. This made them look for settings 
in which such contacts were most likely to occur. In 
a regional setting and application, they found that 
borderlands and frontiers turned out to be fascinating 
arenas of contact, and provided new avenues for research. 
Frontier studies have now become a fixed ingredient of the 
anthropological and historical research agenda. They were 
already so for a long time in geography and geopolitics, 
though from a quite different perspective. Interestingly 
however, these new studies are not any longer framed by 
conventional schemes in which a central power dominates 
a dependent periphery. Instead, frontier populations are 
nowadays seen as actively reshaping and reorganizing 
their social and economic lives within new sets of external 
relations. Negotiations between center and periphery are 
as much dominated by state politics and international 
relations as by local survival strategies. A warning seems 
in place here: Not all frontier populations are in a position 
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to actively change their lives for the better. Some remain 
caught in a relentless struggle with expanding state 
structures, sometimes compounded by international 
military strife. It is against this broad analytical setting 
that the experience of Himalayan trade will be set, in 
particular that of the Nyishangba of Manang in North-
Central Nepal. 
In what follows I will briefly discuss the main explanations 
given so far for trade by Himalayan groups and finally 
set them in a multi-disciplinary scheme of interpretation 
that, in my view, makes it possible to do justice to the 
structural-historical particularities of Himalayan trade. 
The question to be answered remains the same: why were 
the Nyishangba successful in establishing a trade network 
covering large parts of South and Southeast Asia. Was it 
the harsh ecology of their homeland, which forced them 
to look for extra-local income? Did specific forms of social 
organisation or cultural practice facilitate their rise as 
traders? Were there particular economic opportunities 
or incentives that made capital formation possible? What 
was the influence of a nascent Nepalese state on the rise 
of the Nyishangba as a group? And in what ways did wider 
geopolitical developments enhance or hinder the rise of 
the Nyishangba as long-distance traders?
Let us begin with the ecological argument, which at first 
sight provides the answer to many questions as far as 
traditional trade is concerned. According to the British-
Austrian anthropologist Von Fürer-Haimendorf (1975), 
the eminence grise of Himalayan research, “a self-contained 
peasant economy based on agriculture and animal 
husbandry cannot be sustained by the natural resources of 
valleys lying above 3,300 meters” (at least so in the Central 
Himalayas). There seems to be an element of necessity 
then in the occurrence of extra-local activities. The short 
growing season in combination with a shortage of labor as 
inherent to many traditional farming systems, prevents 
the realization of a balanced subsistence budget, thus 
providing an ecological stimulus to subsidiary income 
strategies. This may explain the winter exodus of many 
high altitude dwelling groups to lower regions to find work 
as laborers or to engage in a little trade. 
A recent commentator on Nyishangba affairs even went 
so far as to state that there is an early ecological basis 
for social and economic cooperation in Manang, rooted 
in the absolute dependence on irrigation in a semi-arid 
environment, which has contributed to the development 
of systems of mutual cooperation and reciprocity, which 
have now carried over into the economic sphere. For a 
human geographer raised in the tradition of the géographie 
humaine, such an argument is hard to swallow. This type 
of physical determinism has long been abandoned in 
human geography. It is like explaining Dutch national 
wealth through its history in dyke-building and communal 
water management. Nobody believes such a thing in the 
Netherlands. Other and much more multi-factorial forces 
are at work here. The same commentator’s extension of 
the argument to other village-based societies throughout 
the world, especially to village communities inhabiting 
challenging ecological niches in highland areas is another 
instance of a now outdated physical determinism.
Then we come to the question whether specific forms of 
cultural practice did facilitate the rise of a set of values 
and attitudes that are favorable to the development of 
trade. This is a moot point, because it touches on one of 
the most debated issues in anthropology. Summarily we 
may say that it concerns the debate between materialists 
and mentalists. The materialists believe that human 
action gains shape by the way people cope with nature. 
These naturalists are very much interested in cultural 
ecology and its systemic, not say deterministic, qualities. 
Mentalists, in contrast, believe in the primacy of the 
human mind, the steering quality of cultural rules, and 
perhaps the autonomy of culture. Materialists are inclined 
to see the development of trade as a process of natural 
adaptation to geographical, biological or economic 
circumstances. Mentalists, in contrast, believe that the 
development of trade has more to do with the socialization 
of youngsters into patterns of behavior characterized by 
social flexibility and instrumental capabilities, a learning 
process ultimately leading to a sort of business culture 
finely ingrained into the minds of traders. 
Recently, geographer and anthropologist Clint Rogers 
made this entrepreneurial culture into one of the corner 
stones of his argument in explaining Nyishangba success 
in trade (2004). Rogers, in his book-length analysis, 
repeatedly mentions the existing culture of mutual 
trust and reciprocity. He also points to frequent cases of 
spontaneous voluntary generosity, whether helping an 
incipient trader to a private loan, or extending the terms 
of repayment in times of adverse economic weather. 
‘Doing friendship’ according to one of his informants, 
is the social and economic lubricant par excellence of 
Nyishangba society and, by implication, economy. 
However, in between the lines of Rogers’ study, we read 
about aggressive and opportunistic behavior, about illicit 
business and smuggling, as well as the exploitation of 
black markets by the Nyishangba. Moreover, the external 
perception of these Manangi, as they are commonly called 
in Kathmandu, is notoriously negative, whether fully 
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justified or not. That is why in his conclusion Rogers is 
forced to admit that “It remains be seen whether local 
cooperative norms will be strong enough to overcome the 
heightened competition, mistrust, and dissent that have 
emerged among Manang’s entrepreneurial community” 
(2004). 
A related question at a higher level of analysis is whether 
an overarching socio-cultural tradition may provide an 
explanatory framework for becoming better traders in 
one group over another. This could be a viable argument, 
provided its relation can be demonstrated to the group 
cohesion and corporate organization as referred to 
above. The latter may be articulated in the form of a 
specific religious tradition as Von Führer-Haimendorf 
did with Buddhism and Hinduism, but, as with Max 
Weber’s interpretation of the protestant ethic and the 
rise of capitalism, it should be remembered that there is 
no implication whatsoever that a religious tradition per 
se (whether Christianity or Buddhism) is of any primary 
causal importance. As Trevor Ling in a thoughtful article 
demonstrated, it is “only in conjunction with various 
other, non-religious factors, and in certain favorable 
situations” that the cultural factor in the guise of religion 
may explain a particular development (1985). Weber, at the 
beginning of the twentieth century, knew this already and 
argued for a multi-factorial explanation of socio-economic 
change.
Now we come to the question whether there were 
particular economic opportunities or incentives 
facilitating Nyishangba trade. Local subsistence trade in 
the Himalayas was and is based on the exploitation of 
differences in supply of and demand for products hailing 
from different ecological zones. Further commercial 
incentive arose from locational opportunity as expressed 
in the nearness to natural channels of transport, which 
favored some Himalayan groups beyond others. The 
Thakali in the neighboring Gandaki Valley, for example, 
were extremely well located to control the exchange of 
basic products like salt, wool, and grain between Tibet 
and the middle hills of Nepal. Not having direct access 
to a major Trans-Himalayan trade route or pass, the 
Nyishangba were more or less forced to look to the South, 
and exploit whatever minor trade possibilities existed. This 
southward orientation, from an early date onwards, set 
them on a road to explore long-distance trade activities, 
which over time became separated from the productive 
basis of their home district and assumed wholesale 
character on a family or village basis. In the course of the 
process there occurred a change into the direction of more 
luxury and expensive items of trade. 
In the choice of their long-distance trade products, 
the Nyishangba have always understood very well the 
importance of the mechanism of the low weight for value 
ratio. The less the weight and the higher the value of a 
product, the more it suited the Nyishangba in their search 
for niche-markets in which high prices could be realized. 
The geographical distances involved were considered less 
important because of low fixed costs. In addition some of 
the traders were prepared to take considerable risk, which 
brought early capital formation to some households or 
families. Innovation in transport and the growth of low 
labor-cost production centers in Southeast Asia did the 
rest. But can this brief summary of economic opportunity 
alone explain the rise of the Nyishangba as international 
long-distance traders?
This brings us to the further question as to the role played 
by a nascent Nepalese state in the rise of the frontier-
dwelling Nyishangba as a privileged group of traders. Up 
till now I have deliberately avoided, as much as clarity 
permits, the use of the concept of ethnic group, let alone 
ethnic minority, because ethnic identities more often 
than not tend to be fluid, and minority problems only 
seem to have arisen with the growing power of the state. 
Such a state-driven monopoly of force, as for example 
manifest in Nepal during the nineteenth century, implies a 
precarious process of historical articulation between state 
and group. Such a view was already put forward in 1964 by 
the Dutch historical sociologist Wertheim in his seminal 
article on the political economy of trading minorities. 
He did so, because he felt that the focus on social and 
cultural traits of ethnic groups could never in itself explain 
the rise of economically powerful minorities, but that it 
was necessary to make reference to political attempts 
at incorporation of the groups concerned. By stressing a 
historical perspective, Wertheim, in a sense, was far ahead 
of his time. Together with the emphasis on the role of 
political and economic factors, especially in relation to the 
state, he provides us with a relatively early instance of a 
dynamic approach to the social sciences.
With regard to state power in the Central Himalayan 
region, the answer to the question of territorial and 
perhaps group excellence in trade is likely to be found 
in the special relationship between group and state, 
through which the Nepalese government sought to secure 
its territorial integrity by pursuing an active policy of 
containment relative to Tibet. It is here that a geopolitical 
perspective enters into our analysis.
Given the strategic location of certain Tibetan or 
Tibetanized groups near easy passages into Tibet, it was 
but a matter of time before the ruling elite in Kathmandu 
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realized the potential benefits of an active containment 
policy. The geo-politically tense situation between Nepal 
and Tibet, led to a policy in which specific privileges 
were conferred on persons or groups that could possibly 
contribute to the upholding of Nepalese territorial rights. 
Growing government interest in Nyishangba affairs from 
the 1950s onwards may be viewed in the same light. The 
official attention for Manang had almost certainly to do 
with incipient claims for greater local autonomy in a 
contested frontier region in the post-WWII years. In order 
to control and if possible to co-opt a small but vigorous 
community in times of turbulent statehood and amidst 
a tense Cold War situation, moreover compounded by 
the presence of  CIA-backed Tibetan freedom fighters 
in Manang and neighboring Mustang, the Nyishangba, 
from the 1960s onwards, were lured into closer bonds 
of patronage with the Kathmandu power holders. It 
may seem paradoxical, giving more economic power 
to those who already possess it, but this policy had the 
virtue of weaving the web of state more tightly around a 
peripheral group, both in the sense of containing them in 
a geopolitical way and at the same time providing further 
avenues for economic development.
The gist, then, of this story is that social science has a lot 
to gain by a historical point of view. Although a structural-
analytical point of departure cannot be avoided, it is 
only within a particular geo-historical context that a 
phenomenon such as the rise of the Nyishangba can be 
understood. Analysis, which is structural, needs to be 
supplemented by synthesis, which is historical. Such a 
contextual approach is multi-disciplinary in character and 
interpretive in style. It implies that theoretical constructs 
formulated from within a single academic discipline are 
to be handled with care, because in isolation they tend to 
obscure the contextual grounding and contingent quality 
of much trade experience and practice.
The historical rise of the Nyishangba of Manang as 
long-distance traders has turned out to be an extremely 
complex process. In accounting for their success, it seems 
best to avoid any ecological, socio-cultural, economic 
or geopolitical determinism. Although structurally 
and historically perhaps not entirely dissimilar to the 
experience of other trading groups, it seems useful 
to stress the particularity in the Nyishangba trade 
experience. A position between structure and history 
seems best to enhance our understanding of comparable 
particularities. 
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